A distributional argument for supply-side climate policies by Asheim, Geir Bjarne
A distributional argument
for supply-side climate policies
Geir B. Asheim∗
July 9, 2012
Abstract
This paper presents a distributional argument for the use of supply-side climate
policies whereby carbon emissions are controlled through (i) depletion quotas or
(ii) permanent confiscation of a fraction of the in situ carbon stocks. The modeling
considers intertemporal competitive equilibria in the Cobb-Douglas version of the
Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz model of capital accumulation and costless resource
extraction. It is shown how policies (i) and (ii) preserve the functional distribu-
tion of income between capital owners and resource owners, compared to the case
where no climate policy is needed, while suggested demand-side policies do not.
Such observations are of interest as avoiding functional redistribution may facili-
tate climate change negotiations. The paper discusses policy implications of the
analysis outside the simplified setting of the stylized model.
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1 Introduction
Anthropogenic climate change is in large measure caused by release to the atmosphere
of carbon from stable deposits in underground reservoirs of fossil fuels and in forests
formed through photosynthesis. With the exception of recent attempts to avoid or
delay tropical deforestation, the unfccc’s emphasis on territorial emissions has lead
to a process focused on demand-side efforts that seek to control emissions of carbon
dioxide to the atmosphere through emission quotas or emission taxes. This paper
presents a distributional argument for the use of supply-side policies whereby carbon
emissions are controlled through depletion quotas or through permanent confiscation of
a fraction of the in situ carbon stocks, and argues that such instruments may facilitate
international climate change negotiations.
Without major advances in ccs, successful climate policies rely on limiting the
cumulative emissions of carbon and require that large deposits of coal and unconven-
tional oil and gas be left in situ for the indefinite future. One possible policy measure,
in the spirit of the initiatives to protect tropical forests, is to buy up property rights
for in situ fossil fuels which, taking into account the long-run costs and risks of cli-
mate change, should be left undeveloped and put them in a permanent reserve. These
are the deposits for which extraction has the smallest economic value and the highest
environmental cost.
Another possibility is to let net carbon depletion be controlled through depletion
quotas or depletion taxes. In comparison to emission quotas or emission taxes, two
advantages are clear:
(i) The number of agents that deplete carbon from deposits (or are potential par-
ticipants in ccs efforts) is much smaller than the number of agents that emit
carbon dioxide to the atmosphere (see, however, the assessment of Aldy et al.,
2010, sect. 3.1.1).
(ii) If climate policies succeed and the world becomes less reliant on burning carbon,
then the institutions can be rolled back, in particular if implemented through
long-term depletion quotas allocated to a small number of actual and potential
fossil fuel producers. In contrast, they need to be maintained when policies are
based on demand-side instruments, if negligible carbon-use remains wide-spread.
The supply-side perspective and the fact that greenhouse gas emissions to a large
extent derive from depleting non-renewable resources have gained much prominence in
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the recent debate on the “green paradox” initiated by Sinn (2008) and further discussed
in many recent papers (see, e.g., Gerlagh, 2011; Hoel, 2010, 2012; van der Ploeg and
Withagen, 2011). This literature points out that development of backstop technologies
and escalation of carbon pricing may constitute a gradual confiscation of stocks of non-
renewable resources and, hence, may motivate their owners to accelerate the extraction
of such resources. As a byproduct, this increases the rate of carbon emissions. Climate
policies that seek to develop backstop technologies and escalate carbon pricing may thus
have perverse consequences. In the present paper I consider such supply-side effects in
a very simple setting as, in my context, the avoidance of unacceptable damage from
climate change makes the resource stock valueless.
Supply-side instruments have also been discussed in the academic literature, with
Bohm (1993) and Hoel (1994) being early contributions and Harstad (2012a,b) rep-
resenting recent ones, as well as in more popularized writings (Tickell, 2008). One
motivation for this literature has been to investigate whether supply-side policies have
better properties than demand-side policies when the free-riding of some set of coun-
tries leads to partial participation. Throughout most of the present paper I assume
full participation and note the distributional consequences of different kinds of policies.
Such observations are of interest as avoiding functional redistribution may be a prereq-
uisite for climate agreements with wide participation and may thus facilitate climate
change negotiations. However, I also point out that supply-side policies may be less
prone to leakage if participation is not global.
My modeling entails that resource extraction is costless up to total exhaustion. This
implies that a large portion of the carbon taxation (or other kinds of carbon pricing)
designed to reduce cumulative resource extraction is borne by the resource owners as
the net (of carbon taxation) price of resource input is pushed down to zero. In the
real world, where different deposits of fossil fuels have different extraction costs, the
incidence of carbon taxation will be more moderate (see, e.g. Me´jean and Hope, 2010).
I have adopted the perspective that the atmosphere’s cumulative capacity for ab-
sorbing CO2 is a non-renewable and exhaustible resource. In the medium run, in which
oceans and other carbon sinks contribute to the absorption of atmospheric carbon,
this simplification is not accurate. However, in the very long run and with the moti-
vation that serious climate change should not only be delayed but even avoided, this
perspective is relevant and supported by climate modeling (cf. Allen et al., 2009).
In the present paper I investigate the distributional effects of climate policies by
considering intertemporal competitive equilibria within the Cobb-Douglas version of
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the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-Stiglitz (dhss) model of capital accumulation and costless
resource extraction (Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; Solow, 1974; Stiglitz, 1974). Since the
assumption of no extraction cost implies that the resource stock is homogeneous, there is
no problem of selecting which resources are to be put into permanent reserve. Moreover,
I will assume that announced policies are perceived to be credible; e.g., it is believed
that resources put into permanent reserve will remain unavailable for development and
extraction at some later point in time.
In the setting of this stylized model I will show how permanent confiscation, without
compensation, of a fraction of the in situ carbon resources large enough to avoid serious
climate change preserves the functional distribution of income between capital owners
and resource owners. Furthermore, I show that this solution can be obtained also by
depletion quotas, but not by other suggested alternatives.
As the dhss abstracts from many features of the real world, the presentation of
this paper should be interpreted as pedagogical device intended to stimulate discussion
by illustrating distributional consequences of different kinds of climate policies. In the
interest of clarity, I have kept my model as simple as possible (instead of introducing
complicating features like those considered by Eisenack et al., 2012). Even though
the introduction of backstop technologies and the division of fossil fuels into different
extraction cost classes would modify the conclusions considerably, I still believe that
the illustrations presented within the setting of the dhss model might be of interest.
In Section 2 I introduce the model and present as a benchmark closed-form solu-
tion for the optimal paths of production, consumption, net investment and resource
depletion, without and with the potential for climate change damage. In Section 3, I
analyze the distribution consequences of demand-side instruments, while in Section 4, I
do the same for supply-side instruments. In Section 5, I illustrate the results within the
context of a two-country world. Finally, I discuss the relevance of these observations
in Section 6 and offer concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 Model
Consider the Cobb-Douglas version of the dhss model:
Q = KαRβN1−α−β = C + K˙ ,
where I denote by Q non-negative net production, by K non-negative capital, by R
non-negative resource input (of fossil fuel), by N positive population which is assumed
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to be constant, and by C non-negative consumption, and where
α > 0 , β > 0 , α+ β < 1 .
The assumption that α + β < 1 means that labor inputs are productive. There is no
depreciation of capital and no cost of extracting the resource.
Let the lower-case variables, q, c, k, r, refer to per capita values so that
q = kαrβ = c+ k˙ , (1)
as the production function exhibits constant returns to scale and population is constant.
There are positive initial per capita stocks of capital and resource, (k0,m0)  0.
To model climate change as simply as possible, assume that there is a cumulative
absorption capacity in per capita terms, m¯ > 0, of emitted resource input, up to which
climate change causes no damage and above which climate change causes unacceptable
damage. One might interpret m¯ as an agreed-upon target for cumulative emission;
however, if there are damages also below m¯, then consumption ceases to be an indicator
of wellbeing and the paths that I consider will not be optimal.
The path {c(t), q(t), k(t), r(t)}∞t=0 is feasible if∫ ∞
0
r(t)dt ≤ min{m0, m¯}
are satisfied, and (1) holds for a.e. t > 0 with k(0) = k0. Henceforth, a ‘path’ will always
refer to a feasible path. In the deterministic setting considered here, if m¯ < m0 so that
the climate threshold m¯ is binding, then the resource stock m(t) = m0−
∫ t
0 r(τ)dτ can
be depleted down to m0 − m¯ without incurring any risk for climate change damage.
Note that this modeling of climate change in the setting of the dhss model entails that
greenhouse gas emission is in fixed proportions to resource input, and the only form for
mitigation is to reduce resource input.
I will present closed-form solutions of paths with sustainable consumption, defined
as paths for which consumption never exceeds the sustainable level. For this purpose,
I assume that an efficient path with a constant savings rate s is chosen; that is, at all
times, k˙(t) = sq(t). As shown by Asheim et al. (2007, Thm. 10),1 (i) if s = β, then
the efficient constant savings rate path is optimal according to a maximin objective, so
that {c(t), q(t), k(t), r(t)}∞t=0 satisfies
inft≥0 c(t) ≥ inft≥0 c˜(t)
1With stationary population, the savings rate s is both a gross of population growth savings rate and
a net of population growth savings rate, which are denoted a and b in Asheim et al. (2007) respectively.
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for any path {c˜(t), q˜(t), k˜(t), r˜(t)}∞t=0, and (ii) if s ∈ (β, α), then the efficient constant
savings rate path is optimal according to an undiscounted utilitarian objective with
constant elasticity of marginal utility given by
η =
1− β
s− β ,
so that {c(t), q(t), k(t), r(t)}∞t=0 satisfies
limsupT→∞
(∫ T
0
c˜(t)1−η
1− η dt−
∫ T
0
c(t)1−η
1− η dt
)
≤ 0
for any path {c˜(t), q˜(t), k˜(t), r˜(t)}∞t=0. An efficient constant savings rate path with s ≥ α
is not feasible, and an efficient constant savings rate path with s < β is not sustainable.
Eqs. (10), (12) and (17)–(24) of Asheim et al. (2007) imply that the efficient constant
savings rate path with s ∈ [β, α) corresponds to the following closed-form solution:
c(t) = (1− s)q(t) , (2)
q(t) = q(0)(1 + σ q(0)k0 t)
s
σ
−1 , (3)
k(t) = k0(1 + σ
q(0)
k0
t)
s
σ , (4)
r(t) = (q(0)k−α0 )
1
β (1 + σ q(0)k0 t)
−α−s
σ
−1 , (5)
where
q(0) =
[
(α− s)βkα−β0
(
min{m0, m¯}
)β] 11−β
(6)
and σ := [(1 − α − β)s + αβ]/(1 − β). In the maximin case, β = s = σ, so that
consumption, production and capital investment are constant, as established already
by Solow (1974, sect. 9). In the undiscounted utilitarian case, σ < s < α, so that
consumption, production and capital investment are increasing functions of time; see
Dasgupta and Heal (1979, pp. 303–308) for an early treatment of this case.
Asheim et al. (2007) provide closed-form solutions also for efficient constant savings
rate paths with quasi-arithmetic growth in population and technology. The present
analysis concentrates on efficient constant savings rate paths with stationary popula-
tion and stationary technology only because these are the simplest sustainable paths.
Everything can be generalized to the wider classes of sustainable paths considered by
Asheim et al. (2007).
Let p(t) denote the marginal productivity of resource input at time t:
p(t) = β
q(t)
r(t)
. (7)
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The path described by (2)–(5) satisfies the Hotelling rule since the growth rate of p(t)
equals the marginal productivity of capital:
p˙(t)
p(t)
= α
q(t)
k(t)
.
The Hotelling rule ensures no profitable arbitrage of resource input. If, on the one
hand, m0 < m¯, so that the resource constraint m0 is binding, p(t) is the Hotelling rent
on the resource, while there is no scarcity rent on the cumulative absorption capacity.
If, on the other hand, m¯ < m0, so that the climate threshold m¯ is binding, p(t) is the
scarcity rent on the cumulative absorption capacity, while the Hotelling rent on the
resource is zero.
Since the Hotelling rule is satisfied, the path can be implemented as a decentral-
ized intertemporal competitive equilibrium, with the savings rate s determined endoge-
nously, for appropriate intertemporal preferences for the consumers. In this equilibrium
at time t, the wage rate equals the marginal productivity of labor, (1− α− β)q(t), the
rate of interest equals the marginal productivity of capital, αq(t)/k(t), and the resource
price equals p(t). The possibility of decentralization relates to whether the path is com-
petitive, which in this model corresponds to the Hotelling rule; not to whether the path
is optimal according to a particular criterion (like discounted utilitarianism).
To be explicit, assume that the economy is divided into I dynasties, where each
dynasty i has a constant population share ni and initial per capita endowments of
capital ki0 and resource m
i
0. The initial endowments of the I dynasties add up to the
initial aggregate per capita stocks:
∑I
i=1k
i
0 = k0 and
∑I
i=1m
i
0 = m0.
Each dynasty i manages its stocks of capital and resource to maximize a maximin
objective in the case where s = β and an undiscounted utilitarian objective with con-
stant elasticity of marginal utility equal to (1−β)/(s−β) in the case where s ∈ (β, α),
subject to its initial endowments and its budget constraint at each time t. Since all dy-
nasties are faced with the same structure of interest rates (and, in the case where s > β,
the utility function has constant elasticity of marginal utility), their consumption paths
will be scaled versions of the aggregate consumption path.
If, m0 < m¯, so that the resource constraint m0 is binding, then dynasty i’s budget
constraint at time t is
ci(t) + k˙i(t) + p(t)m˙i(t) = (1− α− β)q(t)ni + αq(t)k
i(t)
k(t)
. (B0)
The mix of ki(t) and mi(t) does not matter for each dynasty i, as the Hotelling rule
ensures that both assets have the same return. At the aggregate level, the objectives of
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the dynasties and the intertemporal competitive equilibrium ensure that
∑I
i=1k
i(t) =
k(t) and
∑I
i=1m
i(t) = m(t) hold at each time t. Summing (B0) over all dynasties and
invoking (7) yield
∑I
i=1 c
i(t)+ k˙(t)−βq(t) = (1−α−β)q(t)+αq(t), showing by eq. (1)
that the consumption of the dynasties add up to what is available at each time t.
I follow common terminology by letting the functional income distribution refer to
the distribution of income between the owners of the various factors of production.
I base my income definition on the theory of comprehensive accounting as developed
since Weitzman’s (1976) seminal article. In particular, I apply the Sefton-Weale (Sefton
and Weale, 2006) accounting methodology (national income is the present value of the
future interest on consumption) and its use by Asheim and Wei (2009) (sectoral income
is the present value of the future interest on cash-flow accruing to the sector). By this
national income definition, (i) welfare is increasing if and only if national income exceeds
consumption, and (ii) national income equals net national product in a closed economy
with stationary technology. Furthermore, it can be divided in a natural way into income
accruing to individuals. The sectoral income definition splits national income on the
various sectors by keeping track of how each sector contributes to individual income.
In the case of efficient constant savings rate paths in the Cobb-Douglas version of
the dhss model when no climate policy is needed (i.e., m0 < m¯), it is particularly easy
to derive the functional income shares (see Asheim and Hartwick, 2011, Sect. 7). Then
total consumption (1− s)q(t) (which equals total cash-flow) is divided into a cash-flow
(1− α− β)q(t) of wages to workers, a cash-flow (α− s)q(t) of return on capital minus
the cost of reinvestment to capital owners, and a cash-flow βq(t) of revenue to resource
owners. Because of the Cobb-Douglas technology and the constant savings rate, the
relative shares of the total cash-flow accruing to the owners of the various factors of
production are fixed through time. Therefore, these relative shares are the functional
income shares, as summarized in the following table.
Table 0: Relative functional income shares
in the DHSS model with no policy (m0 < m¯)
Workers: 1−α−β1−s
Capital owners: α−s1−s
Owners of resource (or cumulative absorption capacity): β1−s
Even though the technology is stationary, the environments for the workers, the
capital owners, and the resource owners are not stationary. The workers experience an
increasing wage (if s > β), the capital owners a decreasing interest rate, and resource
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owners an increasing resource price. Thus, “terms-of-trade” improve for workers and
in particular for resource owners, while they deteriorate for capital owners. This is
reflected by the dynamic income definition that underlies Table 0. Furthermore, Table
0 can be used to determine the relative income share of each dynasty i as follows:
1− α− β
1− s · n
i +
α− s
1− s ·
ki(t)
k(t)
+
β
1− s ·
mi(t)
m(t)
.
The question posed in the next three sections is: What kind of climate policies leave
the relative functional shares unchanged when comparing a situation where m0 < m¯,
so that the resource constraint m0 is binding, with a situation where m¯ < m0, so that
the climate threshold m¯ is binding and climate policies are needed to implement the
optimal path?
An alternative approach would be to assume that m¯ < m0 and compare the distri-
butional effects of the inefficient solution where no policy is implemented with different
kinds of efficient climate policies. However, to determine functional shares of dynamic
income in the former case one must specify what would happen when accumulated
resource extraction goes beyond m¯, both in terms of the behavior of the path and in
terms of climate damages. Moreover, such an analysis would involve the calculation
of dynamic income in an economy with an imperfect resource allocation mechanism
(Arrow et al., 2003), in a setting with a maximin or undiscounted utilitarian objective.
Keeping m0 fixed, and comparing a situation where min{m0, m¯} = m0 with a
situation where min{m0, m¯} < m0, one can also ask what happens to the absolute
functional income shares. Since total income at time 0 equals net product (= (1 −
β)q(0)) and q(0) is given by (6), it follows that the elasticity of total income w.r.t. to
m¯ equals β/(1−β) when the threshold m¯ is binding. Since β < α < 1−β, this elasticity
is less one, implying that a smaller m¯ reduces income but less than proportionally.
In Sections 3 and 4 I assume that the policies are implemented by a global govern-
ment, an assumption that will be relaxed in the subsequent Section 5.
3 Demand-side policies
In the present section I consider demand-side climate instruments – emission taxes
and emission quotas which can be auctioned off or allocated freely – in the case where
m¯ < m0, so that the climate threshold m¯ is binding. Throughout I assume that tax
revenues and revenues from quota sales accrue to the government. The path is efficient
only if these revenues are distributed back to the consumers as lump-sum transfers,
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but I do not specify how this is done. Under the assumption that all consumers have
the same intertemporal preferences, there are no general equilibrium effects of different
distributional policies.
Policy 1: Emission taxes or auctioned emission quotas. Since m¯ < m0, so that the
path does not exhaust the resource stock, Hotelling rents are zero along the optimal
path, and p(t), as determined by (3), (5) and (7), is the scarcity rent on the cumulative
absorption capacity. This in turn means that an emission tax in terms of resource input
must equal p(t) at each point in time to implement the optimal path. With this time
path of emission taxes, the demand of resource input will be r(t) at each point in time,
leading to a cumulative extraction that approaches m¯ asymptotically. Note that there
are no profitable market opportunities for the remaining resource stock m0 − m¯, even
with zero extraction costs, as increased extraction of resource input would have lead
to a negative price. As revenues from the emission tax are assumed to accrue to the
government and resource owners receive zero revenues, the relative shares become:
Table 1: Distributional effects of Policy 1
Relative functional shares with emission
taxes or auctioned emission quotas
Workers: 1−α−β1−s
Capital owners: α−s1−s
Resource owners: 0
Government: β1−s
Hence, the consequence of emission taxes in the simplified setting of the dhss model
is to confiscate the entire resource wealth and allocate the property rights to the cu-
mulative absorption capacity, m¯ > 0, of emitted resource input to the government.
In the case of auctioned emission quotas, the optimal emission quota in terms of
resource input is, at each point in time, set equal to r(t) as determined by (5) and
auctioned off by the government. Since m¯ < m0 and the equilibrium price of resource
input is zero at each point in time, the equilibrium price for emission quotas in terms
of resource input will equal p(t) at each point in time. As the revenues from the
auction of quotas are assumed to accrue to the government and resource owners receive
zero revenues, the relative shares become the same as for emission taxes. Hence, also
with auctioned emission quotas, the entire resource wealth is confiscated and and the
property rights to the cumulative absorption capacity, m¯ > 0, of emitted resource input
are allocated to the government.
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Both emission taxes and auctioned emission quotas make dynasty i’s resource stock
mi(t) valueless, so that its i’s budget constraint at time t becomes:
ci(t) + k˙i(t) = (1− α− β)q(t)ni + αq(t)k
i(t)
k(t)
+ gi(t) . (B1)
Here gi(t) denotes the lump-sum transfer at time t from the government to dynasty
i, with
∑I
i=ig
i(t) = p(t)r(t) = βq(t) being equal to the government’s revenues from
the emission taxes or auctioned emission quotas. This shows explicitly how the path is
implemented as a decentralized intertemporal competitive equilibrium, provided that
the dynasties have appropriate intertemporal preferences.
Policy 2: Freely allocated emission quotas. The optimal emission quota for resource
input is set equal to r(t) at each point in time and allocated freely to the capital owners
(which are responsible for production and hence emissions). As for the case of auctioned
quotas, the equilibrium price of resource input will be zero and the equilibrium price
for emission quotas in terms of resource input in the quota market will equal p(t) at
each point in time. As the capital owners pay for neither resource input nor emission
quotas, the relative shares become:
Table 2: Distributional effects of Policy 2
Relative functional shares with
freely allocated emission quotas
Workers: 1−α−β1−s
Capital owners: α+β−s1−s
Resource owners: 0
Government: 0
Hence, also in this case, the entire resource wealth is confiscated. However, in this
case, the property rights to the cumulative absorption capacity, m¯ > 0, of emitted
resource input are allocated to the capital owners.
In this case, decentralization is achieved by letting dynasty i’s budget constraint at
time t be given by
ci(t) + k˙i(t) = (1− α− β)q(t)ni + αq(t)k
i(t)
k(t)
+ p(t)r(t)
ki0
k0
, (B2)
implying that the emission quotas are grand-fathered to the capital owners according
to their initial stocks. Such grand-fathering ensures that the dynasties manage their
assets efficiently if emission quotas are made tradable.
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In all cases considered, the relative functional share of the resource owners is reduced
from β/(1−s) to 0 when going from the case where m0 < m¯ to the case where m¯ < m0,
unless the government uses revenues from emission taxes or auctions of emission quotas
to compensate their loss of revenue.
4 Supply-side policies
In the present section I consider supply-side climate instruments – depletion taxes and
depletion quotas which can auctioned off or allocated freely – in the case where m¯ < m0,
so that the climate threshold m¯ is binding. I also consider putting the fraction m0−m¯ of
the resource into a permanent reserve, not to be depleted, with or without compensation
to the resource owners.
Policy 3: Depletion taxes or auctioned depletion quotas. Since m¯ < m0, so that the
path does not exhaust the resource stock, Hotelling rents must be zero. This in turn
means that an depletion tax in terms of resource input must equal p(t) at each point
in time. As these tax revenues are assumed to accrue to the government and resource
owners receive zero revenues, the relative shares become:
Table 3: Distributional effects of Policy 3
Relative functional shares with depletion
taxes or auctioned depletion quotas
Workers: 1−α−β1−s
Capital owners: α−s1−s
Resource owners: 0
Government: β1−s
Auctioned depletion quotas will have the same distributional effects: The optimal
depletion quota for resource input is set equal to r(t) at each point in time and auctioned
off by the government at equilibrium price p(t) at each point in time. Decentralization
is achieved by letting dynasty i’s budget constraint at time t be given by (B1).
Hence, as for the corresponding demand policy (Policy 1), the consequence of deple-
tion taxes or auctioned depletion quotas in the simplified setting of the dhss model is to
confiscate the entire resource wealth and allocate the property rights to the cumulative
absorption capacity, m¯ > 0, of emitted resource input to the government.
Policy 4: Freely allocated depletion quotas. The optimal depletion quota for resource
input is set equal to r(t) at each point in time and allocated freely to the resource
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owners. As for the case of auctioned quotas, the equilibrium price of resource input
will be zero and the equilibrium price for depletion quotas for resource input in the
quota market will equal p(t) at each point in time. Since the depletion quotas are
freely allocated to the resource owners, the revenue from the sale of resource input
accrue to resource owners and the relative shares become:
Table 4: Distributional effects of Policy 4
Relative functional shares with
freely allocated depletion quotas
Workers: 1−α−β1−s
Capital owners: α−s1−s
Resource owners: β1−s
Government: 0
Hence, in this case the property rights to the cumulative absorption capacity, m¯ > 0,
of emitted resource input is allocated to the resource owners, implying that the net
confiscation of the resource stock is limited to the fraction m0 − m¯ that will not be
produced. The increased scarcity of the resource compensates the resource owners for
the effective confiscation of this fraction and thus preserves the functional distribution
of income between capital owners and resource owners.
In this case, decentralization is achieved by letting dynasty i’s budget constraint at
time t be given by
ci(t) + k˙i(t) = (1− α− β)q(t)ni + αq(t)k
i(t)
k(t)
+ p(t)r(t)
mi0
m0
, (B4)
implying that the depletion quotas are grand-fathered to the resource owners according
to their initial stocks. Such grand-fathering ensures that the dynasties manage their
assets efficiently with and without tradable depletion quotas. Without tradable quotas,
the dynasties will deplete their stocks at the same relative rate. Then each dynasty i
receives p(t)r(t)mi0/m0 = −p(t)m˙i(t) in revenues from its quotas at each time t, and
budget constraint (B4) can be seen to coincide with the budget constraint (B0) in the
situation where the resource constraint m0 is binding (i.e., m0 < m¯).
Policy 5: Compensated confiscation of resource stock. The fraction of the resource
stock m0−m¯ not to be depleted is purchased at market prices from the resource owners
and put into a permanent reserve. It follows from the Hotelling rule that the time of
purchase plays no role, as long as it is perceived that the purchase will take place
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at these terms and the compensation of the resource owners is at each point in time
balanced by lump-sum taxes on the economy at large. The relative functional share
accruing to the resource owners net of the compensation received equals β/(1 − s).
When the compensation is added, this share is multiplied by m0/m¯, since the resource
owners are paid not only for resources they deplete, but also for those that are put in
a permanent reserve. The difference
β
1− s
m0
m¯
− β
1− s
is the purchase price (relative to total income) received from the government. Thus,
the relative shares become:
Table 5: Distributional effects of Policy 5
Relative functional shares with com-
pensated confiscation of resource stock
Workers: 1−α−β1−s
Capital owners: α−s1−s
Resource owners: β1−s
m0
m¯
Government: − β1−s m0−m¯m¯
Hence, in this case the resource owners are not only allocated the property rights
to the cumulative absorption capacity, m¯ > 0, of emitted resource input, but they
also receive compensation for the valueless part of the resource stock m0 − m¯ > 0
at the higher scarcity rents induced by the stricter cumulative depletion constraint
that the potential for climate change amounts to. Since the increased scarcity of the
resource by itself compensates the resource owners for the loss of m0 − m¯, this scheme
in effect overcompensates the resource owners at the expense of the government. Since
a smaller m¯ reduces income but less than proportionally, it follows that the resource
owners’ income share is increased not only in relative terms, but also in absolute terms.
In this case, decentralization is achieved by letting dynasty i’s budget constraint at
time t be given by
ci(t) + k˙i(t) + p(t)m˙i(t)
= (1− α− β)q(t)ni + αq(t)k
i(t)
k(t)
+ p(t)r(t)
m0 − m¯
m¯
mi0
m0
− (−gi(t)) . (B5)
Here −gi(t) denotes dynasty i’s lump-sum tax to the government at time t, with∑I
i=i
(−gi(t)) = p(t)r(t)m0 − m¯
m¯
= βq(t)
m0 − m¯
m¯
,
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so that tax revenues balance the government’s compensation of the resource owners.
Policy 6: Uncompensated confiscation of resource stock. The fraction of the re-
source stock m0 − m¯ not to be depleted is confiscated from the resource owners and
put into a permanent reserve. As the increased scarcity of the resource compensates
the resource owners for the confiscation of this fraction, the functional distribution of
income between capital owners and resource owners is preserved:
Table 6: Distributional effects of Policy 6
Relative functional shares with uncom-
pensated confiscation of resource stock
Workers: 1−α−β1−s
Capital owners: α−s1−s
Resource owners: β1−s
Government: 0
Hence, this policy, together with the case of freely allocated depletion quotas, are
the only two that preserve the functional distribution of income when going from a
situation where m0 < m¯, so that the resource constraint m0 is binding, to a situation
where m¯ < m0, so that the climate threshold m¯ is binding. Decentralization is achieved
by letting dynasty i’s budget constraint at time t be given by (B0).
5 A two-country world
The merits of demand-side and supply-side policies can be investigated further by
relaxing the assumption that there is a global government able to implement an efficient
policy. Instead, I consider a two-country world, where competitive world markets with
perfect capital mobility and free trade in resource input and the consumption good
ensure overall productive efficiency in the absence of climate damage.
I make the following assumptions: The total population is divided equally between
the two countries, so that the population size of each equals 12N . Residents of country
1 own the entire capital stock. There is no labor mobility, but perfect capital mobility.
So, since both countries are assumed to have access to the same technology, half of the
capital stock is employed in each country to ensure equal capital-labor ratio and thereby
efficiency. Hence, under such efficient allocation of capital, production is divided equally
between the countries and thus emissions are divided equally between the countries.
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Table 7: Functional income shares in a two-country world
Policy Country 1 Country 2
Capital- Resource- Govern- Capital- Resource- Govern-
owners owners ment owners owners ment
0 NoPol (m0 < m¯)
α−s
1−s 0 0 0
β
1−s 0
1 EmTax/AucEmQ α−s1−s 0
1
2
β
1−s 0 0
1
2
β
1−s
2 FreeEmQ α+β−s1−s 0 0 0 0 0
3 DepTax/AucDepQ α−s1−s 0 0 0 0
β
1−s
4 FreeDepQ α−s1−s 0 0 0
β
1−s 0
5 CompConfisc α−s1−s 0 −12 β1−s m0−m¯m¯ 0 β1−s m0m¯ −12 β1−s m0−m¯m¯
6 UncompConfisc α−s1−s 0 0 0
β
1−s 0
Population is equal to 1
2
N in each country, so that capital and resource input is divided equally between
the countries. The entire capital stock is owned by residents of country 1. The entire resource stock is
located in country 2 and owned by residents of country 2. Policy 0 is no policy intervention. Policies
1–2 are supply-side policies as described in Section 3, with revenues from emission taxes and emission
quotas divided in proportion to emissions. Policies 3–6 are demand-side policies as described in Section
4, with revenues from depletion taxes and depletion quotas divided in proportion to extraction. Policy 5
entails that resource owners are compensated according to Lindahl pricing (cf. Harstad, 2012a, sect. IV.D).
Residents of country 2 own the entire resource stock. As, of course, the in situ resource
stock is not mobile, all extraction of resource input takes place in country 2, while half
of the flow of resource input is employed in each country.
Table 7 summarizes the distributional effects of the six policies considered in Sec-
tions 3 and 4. For all six policies, the aggregate path is given by (2)–(5) under the
assumption that m¯ < m0, so that the climate threshold m¯ is binding and climate
policies are needed to implement the optimal path.
The relative functional income shares are compared to the relative functional income
shares in a hypothetical situation where m0 < m¯, so that the resource constraint m0
would be binding (corresponding to Policy 0 in Table 7). The table shows that only the
supply-side policies whereby resource depletion is controlled through freely allocated
depletion quotas (Policy 4) or through permanent and uncompensated confiscation of a
fraction of resource stock (Policy 6) lead to unchanged distribution when moving from
a situation with m0 < m¯ to a situation with m¯ < m0.
In Table 7 I have assumed that the revenues from emission or depletion taxes and
from auctioning emission or depletion quotas accrue to the country where the emission
or depletion occurs. Because capital, although being owned solely by inhabitants of
country 1, is employed in equal measure in each country, half of the revenues from
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emissions taxes or auctions of emission quota accrue to each country. The resource
stock, in contrast, is assumed to be immobile, so that all revenues from depletion taxes
or auctions of depletion quotas accrue to country 2. This implies that, in addition to
Policies 4 and 6, also Policy 3 (depletion taxes or auctioned depletion quotas) leaves the
international distribution of income unchanged when climate policies are introduced.
Up to now I have assumed full participation and compliance, so that both countries
participate in a climate agrement and undertake the agreed upon measures. Is there any
difference in the performance of the various policies if there is only partial participation
or compliance? In the setting of this section this means that only one of the two
countries implements climate policies.
If only one country, say country i, implements a demand-side policy like Policy 1,
then capital – assumed to be mobile – will relocate to the country, say country j, not
implementing climate policies to equalize returns to investment. Moreover, resource
input will leak in the direction of country j, and the differential in real wage between
the countries will provide an incentive for migration in the same direction. Hence,
a unilateral demand-side policy that increases the price for carbon emissions in one
country only will lead to major inefficiencies, but will have no effect on the eventual
cumulative depletion of the resource stock. It will therefore not be able to ensure that
the climate threshold m¯ is observed. The conclusion is that a one-country demand-side
policy is wasteful, and has no long run climate effect.
The situation is very different if only country 2 implements supply-side policies
3–4 or 6. Since the entire resource stock is located in country 2, this country can
on its own implement the optimal policy without changing the relative distribution
of income between the two countries. Of course, in the spirit of the Coase-conjecture
(Coase, 1972), country 2 will be tempted to announce such policies and then renege
later when cumulative depletion is getting close to the climate threshold m¯. However,
if we abstract from this question of credibility, the conclusion is that a one-country
supply-side policy is optimal if implemented by the country endowed with the resource.
For both capital and the resource, I have assumed that the whole stock is owned by
residents of one country (or one part of the world) only. So equally extreme assumptions
are made for both capital and the resource. The fundamental difference is that capital
is assumed to be perfectly mobile, while in situ resources are assumed to be perfectly
immobile. Hence, it is sufficient to use supply-side policies for the part of the world
endowed with resources, while demand-side policies must have universal coverage if the
factors of production are mobile and all locations have access to the same technology.
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6 Discussion
The analysis of the previous sections has on distributional grounds pointed towards a
solution where all of the resource is confiscated, but where the property rights to the
atmosphere as a carbon sink is awarded to the resource owners by allowing them to
produce a fraction of the total in situ stock.
The analysis has been performed in the setting of the dhss model and, as indicated
already in the introduction, this model constitutes a far too simple representation of
real-word resource markets. Extraction costs differ greatly between, on the one hand,
easily available oil in major Middle-East fields and, on the other hand, marginal deposits
of oil, gas and coal, including unconventional sources of fossil fuels.
If policies designed to avoid unacceptable climate change damage effectively enforce
a ceiling on the cumulative extraction of fossil fuels, then cost efficiency demands that
the deposits for which extraction has the smallest economic value and the highest
environmental cost are left unextracted. Simply confiscating such marginal deposits
will be at the expense of countries in which these resources are located, and to the
benefit of countries – like Saudi Arabia – with low-extraction-cost resources, since the
enhanced scarcity that such policies induce will increase resource rents for deposits
from which the policies allow extraction. Indeed, Persson et al. (2007) find that major
oil producers may profit rather than lose even if demand-side climate policies are used,
since low-extraction-cost oil producers may receive higher producer prices (i.e., prices
net of emission taxes or the cost of emission quotas) in spite of the policies. Likewise,
freely allocating depletion quotas in a cost efficient manner will in effect mimic the
behavior of a comprehensive and internationally sanctioned and monitored opec, where
the original opec members will come out as winners.2
Still, one should be concerned about the futility of demand-side policies:
(i) The unfccc process has attempted to implement demand-side efforts that, if
successful, would limit the cumulative extraction of fossil fuel by lowering the producer
prices of such fuels, and seeks to combine this with redistribution towards the developing
world via the cdm or the Green Climate Fund. Attempting to take property rights away
from resource owners at the same time as externalities are sought to be internalized
might be a recipe for inaction. The reason is that without agreement on property rights
there is no basis on which a mutually beneficial bargain on climate policies might be
2When fossil fuel production is controled by a cartel, one has to analyze how climate policies interact
with cartel behavior; see Liski and Tahvonen (2004). Such analysis is outside the scope of this paper.
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reached. The attempts of resource-endowed countries like Saudi Arabia and Venezuela
to sabotage the unfccc process illustrate the roadblocks that this might lead to.
(ii) Partial demand-side policies lead to leakage of carbon to non-committed coun-
tries, also from sources in countries that in principle support the demand-side policies.
The result may well be that world-wide deposits of coal are extracted and transported to
China as input for industrial production of manufactured goods which are re-exported
back to the countries where the coal originated (see, e.g., Rosenthal, 2010). Unless
demand-side policies are supported by all actual or potential industrial powers (or a
system of border tax adjustments is put in place), such efforts will not be effective in
reducing the eventual cumulative extraction of fossil fuels. In contrast, partial supply-
side policies may well be effective, even if the situation is not as simple as the one
described in Section 5.
The main asymmetry between demand-side policies and supply-side policies is
caused by the mobility of capital (and labor) and the immobility of in situ resources.
This means that demand-side policies must include all actual and potential output
producing countries, while supply-side policies must include only countries with actual
carbon resources. In line with Harstad’s (2012a) analysis, it is actually sufficient to in-
clude the countries where the medium-extraction-cost carbon resources that should be
put in permanent reserve are located. One need not be concerned with low-extraction-
cost carbon resources that should be produced also under efficient climate policies or
high-extraction-cost carbon resources that will not be produced even if no policy is
implemented. However, countries with low-extraction-cost carbon resources might find
in their own interest to compensate the owners of the medium-extraction-cost carbon
resources that efficient supply-side policies keep off the market, as this limits the cu-
mulative supply of fossil fuels.
In this paper I have not analyzed the effects of future advances in (i) ccs and
(ii) new backstop technologies that may serve as potential low cost future sources of
energy and fuel. If ccs – carbon capture and storage – is successful in establishing
stable deposits of CO2, then, within the context of the supply-side policies having been
discussed here, such efforts can be credited with depletion quotas which may be sold
to owners of fossil fuel deposits.
Will technological progress ensure that enough carbon is left indefinitely in stable
underground reservoirs to prevent unacceptable climate change damage without using
explicit instruments to limit extraction? This may be the case if the developed new
techniques lead to greater reductions in the costs of producing energy from alternative
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(non-fossil fuel) sources than in the costs of producing energy by extracting marginal
and unconventional sources of fossil fuels. However, as illustrated by the recent tech-
nological progress in the production of shale gas, it is not assured that technological
progress will be directed towards non-fossil fuel backstop technologies. Hence, it seems
reasonable to assume that development of backstop technologies will serve as a comple-
ment to, but not a substitute for, more direct efforts designed to reduce the eventual
cumulative extraction of fossil fuels.
7 Concluding remarks
The analysis of this paper has emphasized advantages of supply-side climate policies
within the simplified setting of the dhss model. The subsequent discussion has pointed
to reasons why this stylized model may not be an adequate representation of the real
world. In this concluding section I discuss issues that must be resolved in order to im-
plement a supply-side policy that seeks to leave the functional distribution unchanged.
(a) Selection. With different classes of extraction costs, medium-extraction-cost car-
bon resources should be left in situ and put in permanent reserve. As illustrated
by the recent technological progress in the production of shale gas, it is hard to
predict what medium-extraction-cost deposits should be kept in indefinite reserve.
This is an argument for a flexible system that allows for future re-evaluation.
(b) Cost. The owners of such medium-extraction-cost in situ fossil fuels can (at least
in part) be compensated by countries with low-extraction-cost carbon resources,
as these countries gain as as a consequence of the resulting enhanced scarcity rent
for fossil fuels.
(c) Control. The authority enforcing that in situ fossil fuels are kept in permanent
reserve must be respected by the host country. This amounts to preventing the
host country access to these resources, which can be achieved even by threat of
physical force.
(d) Credibility. One must avoid that (it is believed that) resources put into perma-
nent reserve will be available for development and extraction at some later point
in time, because otherwise current prices for fossil fuels will not be affected. De-
stroying the resources will make them permanently inaccessible, but also reduce
flexibility in the event future technological progress changes relative extraction
costs. This is an argument for, instead, seeking to design policies that are time-
consistent (cf. Harstad, 2012a, sect. IV.B).
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This discussion goes beyond the analysis of the stylized model presented this paper and
it is therefore speculative. The analysis and the discussion might, however, motivate a
renewed debate on the need for a re-orientation of climate policies.
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